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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH K. BRADFORD and
TAMMY BRADFORD, his wife,
PlaintiffsAppellants,
vs.

Case No. 16829

MICHAEL ALVEY and
VAUGHN ALVEY, d/b/a
C. HOWARD ALVEY & SONS,
a Partnership; and
MICHAEL E. CROWLEY, a
General Partner, d/b/a
MICRO INVESTMENT, a Utah
Limited Partnership,
DefendantsRespondents.

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Appellants against the
Respondents in which the Appellants seek specific performance
or in the alternative for damages for the alleged breach of
a real estate Earnest Money Agreement.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Respondents
on the ground that the Appellants failed to obtain financing
for the purchase within a reasonable time as required by the
Earnest Money Agreement.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondents seek to have the judgment of the trial
court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In February of 1978, the Appellants, Kenneth and Tammy
Bradford made an offer to purchase a home from the Respondents,
Michael and Vaughn Alvey, d/b/a C. Howard Alvey & Sons (R. 371).
The home was under construction on Lot 95 of the Shiloh subdivision located in Salt Lake County.

(R. 371, Exhibit 1)

Michael

Herzog, a real estate agent employed by Mid-Valley Investment,
a corporation, acted as the Appellants' agent in preparing
an Earnest Money Receipt and Of fer to Purchase Agreement on
the home.

(R. 372, 397, 443)

The Appellants inserted in the

Earnest Money Agreement a condition which read, "Subject to
Buyer obtaining financing (FHA)."

(R. 373, 3'97)

The Respondents,

Alvey accepted Bradfords' offer as it was presented by Herzog.
(Exhibit 1) •

-2-
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Appellants were familiar with the clause "Subject to Buyer
obtaining financing", having inserted the same clause in one
of their two prior purchases of real property.

(R. 410-11)

Appellants concurred with their real estate agent that it was
in their interest to insert the subject to financing clause.
(R. 397)

Appellants purpose in inserting the clause was to

enable them to avoid all obligations under the Earnest Money
Agreement unless or until they obtained a loan committment.
(R. 375, 406)
A few days after the Earnest Money Agreement was submitted
and accepted by the Respondents Alvey, Appellants' real estate
agent make an appointment for them to commence the loan application process at American Home Mortgage.

(R. 375)

During

this meeting the Appellants discussed the qualifications for
a home loan but did not make application for a loan.

(R. 375)

Appellants knew that prequalif ication was different from obtaining
a committment on a loan and that after the initial meeting
at American Home Mortgage, Appellants were aware that they
had not obtained a loan committment.

(R. 419)

Despite their

obligation to obtain financing, the Appellants made no effort
to do so and in the Fall of 1978, the Appellants purchased
another home in Salt Lake County.

(R. 407-08)

Subsequently,

the Appellants sold that home and made inquiry of the construction
foreman when the home subject to the Earnest Money Agreement
would be completed, but still the Appellants made no effort
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to procure financing for the home (R. 419, 441, 386, 389,
397) •
In March of 1979, the Respondent Micro Investment, through
its General Partner, Michael E. Crowley, gave an Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase to the Respondents Alvey, covering
the entire Shiloh subdivision, including the home contracted
on Lot 95.

(Ex. 11)

The Micro Investment Earnest Money Agreement

indicated that the home on Lot 95 was "pre-sold".

(R.

452)

The term "pre-sold" was not intended by the Respondents
Alvey to express any opinion as to the validity of the Appellants'
Earnest Money Agreement, only that an Earnest Money Receipt
had been received.

(R. 457)

In fact, Respondents Alvey had

stated to the Respondents Crowley that the Appellants' Earnest
Money Agreement would probably not be an obligation of Respondent
Micro Investment because Respondent Alvey had been informed
that the Appellants did not want to go forward with the sale.
(R. 452)

The only reason the Earnest Money Agreement was listed

by the Respondents Alvey was to make a full and complete disclosure to the Respondent.Micro Investment of the history of
the subdivision.

(R. 457-58)

The term "pre-sold" was understood

by the Respondent Crowley to mean only that.Micro Investment
would pay the seller's portion of any real estate conunission
on sales of homes already subject to valid Earnest Money Agreements.

(R. 508-09)
-4-
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The Appellants contacted the Respondent Crowley during
the month of April 1979, regarding the Earnest Money Agreement.
(R. 394)

During the conversation, Respondent Crowley indicated

that he would not honor the Earnest Money Agreement because
the Appellants had made no effort to secure a loan committment
during the preceeding thirteen months.

(R. 509)

Thereafter,

the Appellants commenced this law suit, still having never
procured a loan conunittment.

(R. 419)

ARGUMENT

In this appeal, the Appellants alleged three errors of
the trial court.

The first error alleged is that the trial

court erred in finding that the Appellants failed to obtain
financing as required by the Earnest Money Agreement within
a reasonable time.

The Respondents' reply to this allegation

is addressed in Point I.
Second, the appellants allege that the trial court erred
in sustaining respondents' objection on the ground of hearsay
to the Appellants' attempts to testify as to statements made
by a real estate agent.

Respondents address this alleged error

in Point II.
Finally, error is alleged in the trial court's refusal
to permit Appellants to amend their complaint after trial pursuant
to U.R.C.P. lS(b).

This issue is addressed in Point III.

-5-
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POINT I
THE RECORD ON APPEAL DOES NOT CLEARLY PREPONDERATE AGAINST THE FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANTS FAILED TO USE REASONABLE DILIGENCE TO OBTAIN FINANCING AND THEREFORE
THE TRIAL COURT RULING MUST BE AFFIRMED
The trial court properly ruled that where an Earnest Money
Agreement provides that payment of the balance of the purchase
price is conditioned upon the securement of a loan, an implied
condition precedent is

~mposed

diligence to procure the loan.

on the buyer to use reasonable
Anaheim Company v. Holcombe,

246 Or. 541, 426 P.2d 743 (1967); Lach v. Cahill, 85 A.2d 480,
482 (Conn. 1951); Annot., 81 ALR 2d 1338 (1962) •

If the condition

precedent is not performed within the time granted by the agreement,
then there is no binding obligation on either party.
Fell, 144

s.w.

Baker v.

2d 255, 257 (Texas App. 1940); Mecham v. Nelson,

551 P. 2d 529, 533 (Idaho 1969); Highland Plaza, Inc. v. Viking
Investment Corp., 2 Wash. App. 192, 467 P.2d 378, 383 (1970).
Because the Earnest Money Agreement in this case did not state
when the Appellants had to obtain financing, the trial court
ruled that the Appellants had to obtain financing within a
reasonable time.
In commercial Security Bank v. Johnson, 173 P.2d 277,
281 (Utah 1946), this Court defined reasonable time as, "So
much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do
conveniently what the contract or duty required should be done
in a particular case."
Additionally, when the remedy of specific performance
is sought, the court must find that the party requesting such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

remedy has fully and fairly performed all of the conditions
which he has agreed to peform under the contract.
Larson, 129 N.W. 2d 566, 567 (N.D. 1964).

Larson v.

As this court stated

in Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P. 2d 45·, 46 (Utah 1974) :
Specific performance is a remedy of equity;
and one who invokes it must have clean
hands in having done equity himself. That
is he must take care to discharge his own
duties under the contract; and he cannot
rely on any mere inconvenience as an excuse
for his failure to do· so. Even if inconvenience
or difficulty is encountered, he must make
an effort to perform, or to tender performance,
which manifests reasonable diligence and
bona fides his desire to keep his own promises.
After having heard and considered the evidence produced at
trial, the trial court held that the Appellants failed to use
reasonable diligence to obtain a financing agreement.
The Appellants commence their argument against the trial
court ruling by correctly stating that the request for specific
performance of the agreement creates an equitable action which
permits this Court to review both the law and the facts of
the case.

However, Appellants fail to set forth the relevant

standard of review established by this court.

In Timpanogas

Highland, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 483 (Utah 1975), this
Court in reviewing a trial court's refusal to give specific
performance of an Earnest Money Agreement stated:
Even though we may review the facts,
the well established and long followed
rule, is that due to the prerogative of
the trial court as the initial trier of
the facts, and his advantaged position
to judge the credibility of the witnesses
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and the evidence presented, we indulge
the trial court with considerable latitude
in those matters. Therefore, we do not
review in the manner plaintiff suggests:
To determine whether we would agree that
the 'evidence fairly preponderates in favor
of the findings.' But due to the tolerance
indulged as just stated, we do not reverse
unless we are persuaded that the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings.
Therefore, in order for the Appellants to prevail on appeal,
this Court must find that the evidence clearly preponderates
against the Lower Court's finding that the Appellants failed
to use reasonable diligence to do what the contract required
them to do.

The record of the proceedings below, however,

provides firm support for the trial court's ruling.
Initially, the importance of the subject to financing
clause to the Appellants, as buyers, and to the Respondents,
as sellers, must be understood.
were sophisticated buyers.

The Appellants in this case

From previous experience they knew

that the subject to financing condition would give them a way
out of the Agreement in the event that they decided not to
go forward with the purchase. (R. 375, 406) And in their prior
experience they took immediate steps to satisfy the financing
condition precedent.

(R. 411)

It is also important to understand that the Respondents
as building contractors must have the financing condition satisfied
as soon as possible.

First, a builder, such as the Respondents

Alvey, is restricted by a lender as to the number of speculation
homes, those commenced without an identified buyer, which

-8-
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may be under construction at one time.

(R. 472)

Once an offer

is received on a speculation house, such as the house on Lot
95, and the buyer obtains a committment for financing, then
the lender no longer considers the house as a speculation house
for purposes of determining whether or not the builder is entitled
to cormnence another house on a speculation basis.

(R. 472-

73)

Second, a builder must be assured that the buyer has the
financial resources to complete the purchase before the builder
makes improvements suited to the particular taste of the Buyer
which would affect the marketability of the house in the event
the buyer declines to complete the purchase.

(R. 474)

Third, once an offer is received on a house, the house
is taken off the real estate market listing

bo~rd

and if the

buyer fails to take immediate steps to obtain financing and
is later unable to obtain financing then the builder is deprived
of valuable time and exposure necessary to market the property.
(R. 491)

For these reasons it was the general practice of

the Respondents Alvey to either require the buyer to make the
of fer subject to financing which would thereby require the
buyers to obtain proof of their ability to complete the transaction or the Respondents Alvey would insert a 72 hour clause
which stated that if a second offer were received by the Respondent
on the home, then the first buyers would have 72 hours to tender
payment for the home or the second off er could be accepted
by the builder.

(R. 474)

Here the 72 hour clause was not
-9-
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inserted by Respondents Alvey because the offer was subject
to Appellants obtaining financing.
The house on Lot 95 was in the early stage of construction
when the Appellants entered the Earnest Money Agreement.
488)

(R.

Within a couple of days after the Agreement had been

accepted, the Appellants' real estate agent took them to American
Home Mortgage for the purpose of commencing the procedure to
obtain financing.

(R. 375)

A buyer is considered to have

obtained financing when he obtains a letter of committment
from the lender.

(R. 488-89)

After the application procedure

is completed and the loan has been approved by the lender,
the lender will send a letter to the builder informing the
builder that the buyers have qualified for a loan committment
of a particular sum, at a particular interest rate and that
the committment will be binding upon the lender for a stated
time.

(R. 488)

Upon receipt of this letter the buyers have

satisfied the condition precedent and their offer to purchase
is no longer subject to obtaining financing.

(R. 489)

At the conclusion of the meeting at American Home Mortgage,
the Appellants were instructed by their·real estate agent to
continue to pursue the loan.

(R. 414)

However, rather than

follow the agent's advice, the Appellants did not bother to
even commence the process by making an application for a loan.
(R.

419)
An FHA loan committment can only be obtained after qualificatic

of both the property and the buyer.

(R. 515) Qualification
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of a house which is in the early stages of construction, as
was the home on Lot 95, is done by appraisal from a set of
plans and specifications.

(R. 513)

If the home is approved

• and specifications then FHA will issue
by FHA from the plans

a conditional committment on the property subject only to the
home being completed according to the plans and specifications.
(R. 362)

While the property is being qualified by FHA, the

mortgage lender prepares a package establishing the qualification
of the Buyers, for example, verification of employment, income
and debts.

(R. 513)

Upon receipt of the conditional conunittrnent,

the lender will then submit the buyer qualification package
and request from FHA a firm committment.

(R. 363)

When both

the house and buyer have been approved by FHA, a letter of
firm committment is issued which is binding for a period of
six months.

(R. 515)

The president of American Home Mortgage, where the Appellants
initially inquired. about financing, and the Appellants' expert
witness from Mason-McDuffy, where a conventional loan was
eventually obtained in July of 1979, both testified that FHA
financing could have been obtained at the time the Appellants
first went to American Home Mortgage.

(R. 515)

According

to the testimony at trial, a final committment from FHA is
usually received within at least 13 working days from the request
for the committment.

(R. 364)

At its longest, the entire

procedure for obtaining an FHA loan committment does not extend
beyond 90 days.

(R. 362-63, 515)
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The uncontradicted testimony at trial was that if the
Appellants had obtained a loan conunittment, the Respondents
Alvey could have completed the house on Lot 95 within a month
and a half from the date of receipt of the conunittment.
(R.

482, .501)'
The Appellants took the position that they did not have

to obtain financing until construction of the home was completed.
(R. 403)

However, the Appellants also maintained· that they

always intended to reiy on the financing condition as a means
to avoid obligation under the contract.
The Appellants cite in support of

(R. 422)
t~e

reasonableness of

their conduct, the several conversations between Appellants
and the secretary and construction foreman of the Respondents
Alvey.

However, Appellants. never discussed their obligations

under the Earnest Money Agreement but only the obligations
which would arise on the part of the Respondents after receipt
of the loan conunittment.

(App. Brie·f at 11-13)

The Appellants

also admitted that neither of the Respondents Alvey instructed
the Appellants to deal in any manner with the secretary or
construction foreman as to either the construction or the sale
of the house.

(R. 415, 448)

Further, the Appellants never attempted to deal directly
with either of the Respondents Alvey regarding any matter of
financing or construction on the home.

(R. 404)

The record also contains numerous references to what is
considered to be a reasonable time necessary to procure a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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loan in the housing industry.

The Respondents Alvey, as builders ,

testified that a reasonable time to obtain financing was thirty
to sixty days.

(R. 482)

Appellants' expert witness, a mortgage

banker, testified that it takes as much as thirteen working
days to get a firm committment from FHA.

(R. 363-64)

The

President of American Home Mortgage testified that the normal
length of time it takes to obtain a committment from FHA is
sixty days, at the outside, ninety days.

(R. 517)

Respondent

Crowley, as a developer, testified that a reasonable time to
obtain financing is ninety days at the outside.

(R. 525)

Lynn

Marsing, as a real estate broker, testified that at the outside an FHA committment can be obtained within ninety days.
(R. 52!)

Mr. Marsing stated that the industry intent and purpose

of the subject to financing clause was to release all parties
to an Earnest Money Agreement if the condition to obtain
financing was not met or failed to materialize within a reasonable time.

(R. 520).

Finally, and most important, the Appellants simply failed
to take any steps to procure a loan committment until several
months after this action was commenced.

(R. 445 I

419' 345-46)

POINT II
AS PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT, THE STATEMENTS
OF MICHAEL HERZOG WERE HEARSAY EVIDENCE
NOT WITHIN ANY EXCEPTIONS TO UTAH RULES
OF EVIDENCE NO. 63 AND THEREFORE WERE PROPERLY
EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Michael Herzog was a licensed real estate agent employed
by Mid-Valley Investment, a corporation.

(R. 372)

The Respond-

ents Michael Alvey and Vaughn Alvey were general partners doing
business as C. Howard Alvey & Sons, a general construction
company.

(R. 450)

Michael Herzog was requested by the Appellants

to act as their agent in presenting an off er for the purchase
of property from the Respondents Alvey, d/b/a
& Sons.

(R.

c.

Howard Alvey

443)

The Appellants did not obtain the attendance of Mr. Herzog
at the trial, for reasons which were not disclosed in the record.

Rather, the Appellants attempted to testify as to their conversatiorn
with Michael Herzog and later an affidavit was prepared for
Mr. Herzog which was submitted to the court after trial.. (R. 194-96)
The Appellants' efforts to testify as to statements made
by Michael Herzog were objected to by the Respondents on the
ground of hearsay.

The Appellants established no connection

between Mid-Valley Investment, a corporation, and C. Howard
Alvey & Sons, a general partnership, other than at one time,
Michael Alvey was an acting vice president and treasurer of
the corporation and Vaughn Alvey was the acting president and
secretary of the corporation.

(R. 450)

There was no evidence

that at the time Mr. Herzog made any statements to the Appellants
that the Respondents Alvey held any off ice in the corporation
of Mid-Valley Investment.

Nor was there any evidence of the

scope of Mr. Herzog's employment with or his authority to
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speak for Mid-Valley Investment or C. Howard Alvey & Sons.
Further, there was no evidence of any connection between MidValley Investment Corporation and C. Howard Alvey & Sons, a
general partnership.
that

c.

The evidence did establish, however,

Howard Alvey & Sons was a building construction company

and was not a real estate marketing company.

(R. 485)

Based

upon the total absence of evidence of an agency relationship
between Michael Herzog, an employee of Mid-Valley Investment
Corporation and C. Howard Alvey & Sons, a partnership, the
trial court excluded the statements on the grounds of hearsay.

(R. 373-74)
On appeal, the Appellants argue that the statements of

Michael Herzog were admissible under the Authorized and Adoptive
Admissions exception to the hearsay rule, or the Vicarious
Admissions exc·eption to the hearsay rule.

However, Appellants

failed to establish the availability of either exception at
trial.
In order for the statements of Michael Herzog to be admissibl
against the Respondents under Rule 63(8) (a), the Appellants
were required to show that Mr. Herzog was authorized by C.
Howard Alvey & Sons to make a statement for it concerning the
subject matter of the statement.

No evidence of such authorizatio

was submitted at trial and the Appellants cited none in their
brief.

However, the Appellants assert that authorization can

be gleened first from the fact that all negotiations regarding
the sale took place between Bradfords and Herzog and second,
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that the defendant, Michael Alvey instructed Michael Herzog
to assist the Appellants in obtaining financing.
The first assertion that all negotiations regarding the
sale of property took place between Herzog and the Bradf ords
is not born out by the record.

The Appellants

regarding the purchase of the property.

contacted Herzog·

Herzog, acting as

the agent for the Appellants, prepared the offer with those
terms and conditions he felt benefited the Appellants.
373)

(R.

Herzog then presented the offer to the Respondents Alvey

who accepted the conditional offer to purchase and Herzog
communicated acceptance of the offer to the Appellants.

The

Respondents produced no evidence either during or after the
trial to the effect that Michael Herzog acted as the representative
of

c.

Howard Alvey & Sons.

Under these circumstances it has

been recognized that the real estate agent is acting as the
agent of the purchaser.

Duffy v. Setchell, 38 Ill. App. 3d

146, 347 N.E. 2d 218, 221 (1976); Baskin v. Dam, 4 Conn. Cir.
702, 239 A.2d 549, 552 (1967).
The second contention, that the Respondents Alvey instructed
Michael Herzog to assist the Appellants in obtaining financing,
does not provide support for the contention that Herzog acted
as the agent of C. Howard Alvey & Sons.

The Appellants correctly

point out that Respondents Alvey instructed the Bradfords to
obtain financing indirectly through Michael Herzog.
Brief at 18-19)

(Appellants'

However, the Appellants' brief fails to continue

quoting from the record, although the testimony addresses the
precise question of agency raised by the Appellants.
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After stating that Michael Herzog was told to work with Appellants
to obtain financing, the Appellants' attorney asked:
Q.

Mike Herzog is your agent then, isn't he?

A.

No.

He's not.

May I explain something?

(R. 493)

That testimony was uncontradicted and was the only testimony

in the record addressing the existence of an agency between

c.

Howard Alvey & Sons and Michael Herzog.

It should be noted

further that the Respondents Alvey's instruction to Mr. Herzog
to assist the Appellants in obtaining financing

is not evidence

of an agency between the Real Estate agent and the respondents
Alvey, but on the contrary, it is evidence that

c.

Howard Alvey

& Sons, preserved the distinction between the building contractor

and the Real Estate agent, who was responsible to assist the
buyer in obtaining financing.

(R. 476)

In order for the Appellants to rely upon Rule 63 (9),
regarding Vicarious Admissions, the Appellants must first show
that the declarant is unavailable as a witness and second,
that the statement concerned a matter within the scope of an
agency or employment of the declarant for the party.

Appellants

concede that no attempt was made to introduce evidence at trial
to show the unavailability of Michael Herzog.
22)

(App. Brief at

Then the Appellants improperly argue alleged facts upon

which there is no record as justification
availability.

for not addressing

[In this connection it should be noted that

Mr. Herzog was available to provide an affidavit in support
of Appellants' Motion for New Trial, etc.]
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The Appellants claim that because they were unable to
establish an agency between Michael Herzog and

c.

Howard Alvey

& Sons, they were relieved of the obligation to address the
issue of availability of Michael Herzog.

No authority is cited

for this position, on the contrary, Rule 63 (9) provides that
the exception is only available where the Judge makes a finding
as to the availability of the witness.

Therefore even if the

court were to assume that an agency had been established beyond
doubt, the fact remains that the Appellants offered no evidence
as to the unavailability of the witness as required by Rule 63(9).
The error Appellants claim resulted from their failure to
proffer.the testimony for a non-hearsay purpose.

The Appellants

cannot urge, on appeal, a new ground for admissibility.

URE 5;

Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288
(Utah 1978); Taliaferro v. Crola, 313 P.2d 136, 138 (Cal. 1957);
Cochran v. Harrison Memorial Hospital, 254 P.2d 752, 757 (Wash.
1953) •
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
WHERE THE AMENDMENT WAS IMPROPER UNDER
URCP lS(b) AND WHERE THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ISSUE SOUGHT TO
BE INTRODUCED BY THE AMENDMENT.
After the trial, the Appellants attempted to introduce
the issue of equitable estoppel by way of an amendment to the
complaint.

(R. 173-74)

The purpose of the amendment was to
-18-
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attempt to have the Respondents estopped from denying the validity
of the Earnest Money Agreement.

(R. 175, 178)

Denial of the

motion by the trial court was proper on two grounds.
First, the amendment was not proper under the first sentence
of URCP lS(b).

That sentence provides for amendment of the

pleadings only where an issue not raised by the pleadings is
tried by the express or implied consent of the parties.

Contrary

to the Appellants' contention, the issue of estoppel was never
tried by the implied consent of the parties.
The Appellants assert that the issue of estoppel was tried
by implied consent because evidence relevant to an estoppel
was introduced without objection.

(Appellants' Brief at 25)

This assertion is an incorrect generalization of Rule lS(b)
and a misunderstanding of the purpose behind Rule lS(b).
The purpose of Rule lS(b) is to bring the pleadings in
line with issues actually tried and the rule does not permit
amendment of the pleadings to include collateral issues which,
after trial, may find incidental support in the record.

Monroe

v. Futura, Inc., 415 F.2d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1969).
Where evidence relevant to an issue in the case is also
submitted as evidence of an issue not embraced by the pleadings,
the court will not find implied consent to trial of the new
issue unless, at the time of the submission, counsel indicates
that the evidence is to go to both the issue in the pleading
and to the issue outside the pleading.

Wright & Miller, 6

Federal Practice and Procedures §1493 (1971).
-19-

In Cook v. City
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of Price, Carbon County, Utah, 566 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1977):
When evidence claimed to show trial of an
~ssue by consent pursuant to Rule 15(b),
is relevant to a separate issue already
in the case, it would be unjust to the
opposing party to consider a new theory
of recovery after trial is complete. This
rule obtains because an opponent must be
given a fair chance to plan his defense
to meet pleaded allegations (Citations
omitted)
The Appellants argue that testifying to their conversations
with the construction foreman and the office secretary without
objection from the Respondents Alvey, constituted implied consent
to trial of the issue of estoppel by Respondents Alvey.
This Court has recognized that when a trial is to the
bench, rather than to a jury, rulings on the evidence need
not be scrutinized too critically.

Super Tire Market, Inc.

v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P. 2d, 132 (1966).

Additionally,

this Court has held that a judgment should not be reversed
in the absence of error which is substantial and prejudicial
in the sense that there would be a reasonable liklihood of
a different result in the absence of such error.

URCP 61;

URE 5; Arnovitz v. Tella, 27 Utah 2d 261, 264, 495 P.2d 310,
I

312 (1972) .

The Appellants claim prejudicial error because

they were prevented from testifying that Michael Herzog told
them they need not seek financing until the house was completed.
The Appellants claim that this is prejudicial in that, regardless
of the truth of Mr. Herzog's statements, the mere fact that
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he made the statement would be a substantial factor in determining
the reasonableness of the Appellants' conduct and would have,
in all liklihood assured a different decision by the trial
court.

(Appellants' Brief at 24)

However, this prejudice alleged by the Appellants was
not a result of the trial court's exclusion of Mr. Herzog's
statements as hearsay.

The testimony was objected to by the

Respondents and excluded by the trial court only as hearsay.
No objection was made to the testimony insofar as it was relevant
to the issue of reasonableness of the Appellants' conduct.
[It should be noted that the statements of Barney Alvey and
Pam Tazzer were excluded on the ground of hearsay as to the
Respondents Micro Investment and Michael Crowley.]

(R. 385)

The statements of Barney Alvey and Pam Tazzer were in
fact submitted, not as evidence of estoppel, but as evidence
relevant to the central issue of the case, which was the reasonableness of the Appellants' delay in obtaining financing.

Nowhere

is this more clearly demonstrated that in the Appellants' brief
at pages 11 through 13 wherein the same statements are cited
as evidence of the reasonableness of the Appellants' conduct.
The evidence was never prof ferred for the purpose of showing
estoppel.

Therefore, under the established rules governing

the application of URCP lS(b), the trial court correctly ruled
that the issue of estoppel had not been tried by the implied
consent of the parties.
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The second reason the trial court correctly denied Appellants'
Motion to Amend the Complaint was because the element of equitable
estoppel had not been established by the Appellants.

As noted

by the Appellants, equitable estoppel arises when (1) a party
by its actions or representations, induces the other party
to believe certain facts to exist,

(2) that such other party,

acting with reasonable prudence and diligence, relies upon
the acts or representations, and (3) that the party relying
on the representation or acts will suffer injustice if the
other party is permitted to deny such facts.

(Appellants'

Brief at 26).
The Appellants allege that the Respondents should not
be permitted to deny the validity of the Earnest Money Agreement
because of the representations made by Barney Alvey and Pam
Tazzer regarding the construction of the home.

However, the

Appellants admitted that they had never been instructed by
the Respondents Alvey, to deal with either Pam Tazzer or Barney
Alvey regarding construction of the home.

(R. 415, 448)

The

Appellants were aware that the Earnest Money Agreement was
not fully binding until they had obtained financing.
406)

(R. 375,

The Appellants never directly communicated with either

of the general partners of C. Howard Alvey & Sons regarding
any aspect of either the construction of the home or the validity
of the Earnest Money Agreement.

(R. 404, 415)

Finally, it

-22-
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was not until months after the suit was conunenced that Appellants
obtained financing.

(R. 345, 346, 389)

These facts confirm that, notwithstanding the imputation
of the representations of Barney Alvey and Pam Tazzer to the
Respondents Alvey, the Appellants failed to act with reasonable
prudence and diligence as to their obligations under the Earnest
Money Agreement.

As the trial court noted in Finding of Fact

No. 11, the Respondents Alvey did nothing to prevent, hinder
or otherwise impair the Appellants from obtaining financing
within a reasonable time as required under the terms of the
Earnest Money Agreement.

(R. 227)

Finally, the Appellants cannot show that they suffered
injustice by the Respondents' denial of the validity of the
Earnest Money Agreement.

As the trial court recognized, the

central issue upon which the outcome of the case rested, was
whether or not the Appellants took steps to obtain financing
within a reasonable time.

(R. 503-04)

Based upon the substantial

evidence submitted at trial, the lower court concluded that
the Appellants failed to use reasonable diligence as required
by law and therefore would suffer no injustice by the Respondents'
denial of the validity of the contract.

Hawaiian Ocean View

Estates v. Yates, 564 P.2d 436, 442 (Hawaii 1977); Newton v.
Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136, 1144 (Kansas 1978); Citing
28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver §78-80 (1966).
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CONCLUSION
The trial court record reflects substantial evidence upon
which the trial judge based his ruling that the Appellants'
failed to pursue financing for the home with reasonable diligence
I

as was required of them by law.
Exclusion of the testimony of Michael Herzog was proper
in view of the fact that the Appellants failed to establish
admissibility under an exception to the hearsay rule and never
proffered the testimony for a non-hearsay purpose.
Finally, denial of the Appellants' Motion to Amend the
Complaint after trial was proper in view of the fact that the
issue of estoppel sought to be introduced by amendment was
not tried by the implied consent of the parties nor had the
Appellants established that they attempted to perform their
obligations under the contract with reasonable diligence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 12th day of May, 1980

R~ALD L.-POULTON
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents Michael E. Crowley
and Micro Investments
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